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Abstract
Three classes of inflation models are discussed: Standard Phillips curves, New
Keynesian Phillips curves and Incomplete Competition models. Their relative
merits in explaining and forecasting inflation are investigated theoretically and
empirically. We establish that Standard Phillips-curve forecasts are robust to
types of structural breaks that harm the Incomplete Competion model fore-
casts, but exaggerate forecast uncertainty in periods with no breaks. As the
potential biases in after-break forecast errors for the Incomplete Competition
model can be remedied by intercept corrections, it oﬀers the best prospect of
successful inflation forecasting.
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1 Introduction
Theoretical research has begun to explore the implications for monetary policy of
uncertainty about the inflation process, see e.g. Batini et al. (1999). So far only very
specific and limited forms of uncertainty have been considered: For example, the case
where the exact specification of the inflation process is known, but the parameters are
unknown and have to be estimated. However, uncertainty is quite pervasive in that
policy makers face a menu of diﬀerent models, all claiming to correctly representing
the true model of the economy. Also, as emphasized in Svensson (1997), an explicit
inflation target implies that the central bank’s conditional forecast 1-2 years ahead
becomes the intermediate target of monetary policy. Consequently, there is an
unusually strong linkage between forecasting and policy analysis.
The statistical foundation for a conditional forecast as an operational target
is that forecasts calculated as the conditional mean are unbiased and no other pre-
dictor (conditional on the same information set) has smaller mean-squared forecast
error (MSFE), provided the first two moments exist. The practical relevance of the
result is reduced by the implicit assumption that the model corresponds to the data
generating process (DGP), and that the DGP is constant over the forecast horizon.
Credible forecasting methods must take into account that neither condition is likely
to be fulfilled in reality.
There are therefore two elements of forecasting particularly relevant for infla-
tion targeting. First, the inflationary process should be captured as correctly as
possible. Second, forecasting should take into account that structural changes can
occur. As regards the first element, policy makers are faced with several comple-
mentary, and sometimes also competing, economic explanations of the inflationary
process. Thus, a selection process usually takes place where not only econometric
testing but also ‘beliefs’ play a significant role, cf. Granger (1990, 1999). However,
the specific inflation models have one important trait in common: they explain
inflation–a growth rate–by not only other growth rates but also cointegrating
combinations of levels variables. Thus, they are explicitly or implicitly error cor-
rection models or, following Hendry (1995), equilibrium correction models, denoted
EqCMs. This leads to the second element, namely that EqCMs despite providing
good after-the-event explanations of inflation, do not forecast nearly as accurately.
Moreover, when forecasting in the presence of structural breaks, there may be a
relative advantage of using models specified in diﬀerences only–without equilib-
rium correction terms–so called dVARs, see e.g. Clements and Hendry (1999) and
Eitrheim et al. (2002). There is thus a trade-oﬀ between the importance of structural
modelling for understanding and its cost in terms of losing forecasting robustness
relative to dVARs. This paper assesses the importance of this trade-oﬀ for inflation
forecasting.
Specifically, we consider the two most popular inflation models, namely Phillips
curves and wage curve specifications. The standard Phillips curve model (denoted
PCM), though formally an EqCM, might come to inherit some of the forecast-
robustness of a dVAR. This possibility arises simply because the typical Phillips
curve is similar to a dVAR–the only level term included being the output gap or the
unemployment rate. The New Keynesian Phillips Curve Model (NPCM), utilizing
the staggered contracts framework, has been advocated by Clarida et al. (1999)
and Gali and Gertler (1999). It has explicitly forward looking expectations and has
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come to dominate the theoretical literature on inflation targeting in particular, as
laid out in Svensson (2000). Gali and Gertler (1999) also argues for the inclusion
of real unit labour costs instead of an output gap measure, as in the more usual
variants–see e.g. Fuhrer (1997). Phillips-curve models, with or without explicitly
forward looking terms, therefore continue to hold their ground in both theoretical
and empirical models of monetary policy.1
The wage curve is consistent with a wide range of economic theories, see Blan-
chard and Katz (1997), but its original impact among European economists was
due the explicit treatment of union behaviour and imperfectly competitive product
markets, pioneered by Layard and Nickell (1986). Because the modern theory of
wage and price setting recognizes the importance of imperfect competition and in-
complete information on both product and labour markets, we refer to this class
of models as the Imperfect Competition Model–ICM hereafter. Since wage-curve
models are EqCM specifications, they are vulnerable to regime shifts, e.g. changes
in equilibrium means.
The existing empirical evidence on the inflationary process is mixed. Although
varieties of Phillips curves appear to hold their ground when tested on US data–see
Fuhrer (1995), Gordon (1997), Gali and Gertler (1999), and Blanchard and Katz
(1999)–studies from Europe usually conclude that ICM models are preferable, see
e.g. (Drèze and Bean, 1990, Table 1.4), OECD (1997, Table 1.A.1), Wallis (1993)
and Rødseth and Nymoen (1999).
In section 2, we discuss the key diﬀerences between both versions of the
Phillips-curve and the incomplete competition model. Section 3 presents the em-
pirical results for the three contending models of the inflation process in Norway.
In section 4 we discuss the algebra of inflation forecasts based on the competing
models. Section 5 evaluate the forecasting properties. Section 6 concludes.
2 Illustrating inflation models
To illustrate the main diﬀerences between the alternative specifications, consider the
following framework.2
Let w be wages and p consumer prices; with pr as productivity, the wage share
(in terms of consumer prices) is given as ws = w− p− pr, or real unit labour costs;
u is the unemployment rate, gap the output gap and pb import prices, all measured
in logs. We abstract from other forcing variables. A model of the wage-price process
general enough for the present purpose then takes the form
∆w = α∆pe − βws− γu
∆p = δ∆pe + ζ∆w + ηws+ ϑgap+ θ∆pb,
1For example, the Bank of England (1999) includes Phillips-curve models in their suite of
models for monetary policy. Mervyn King, the Deputy Governor of the Bank of England put it
quite explicitly: ‘..the concept of a natural rate of unemployment, and the existence of a vertical
long-run Phillips curve, are crucial to the framework of monetary policy’–see King (1998, p.12).
2Since detailed derivations of the alternative models are readily available elsewhere, we here
focus on the resulting key diﬀerences.
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where ∆pe is expected inflation, and the dynamics is to be specified for each model.
Although the structure is very simple, the diﬀerent models drop out as non-nested
special cases:
1. The New Phillips Curve Model (NPCM)–Gali and Gertler (1999)–is given
as
∆pt = δ1∆pet+1 + η1wst + θ1∆pbt,
where we have also included import prices, to make it relevant for a small
open economy. The expectations term ∆pet+1 is assumed to obey rational
expectations;
2. The Standard Open Economy Phillips Curve Model (PCM) is –Aukrust
(1977), Calmfors (1977), Nymoen (1990), Blanchard and Katz (1997):
∆wt = α2∆pt − γ2ut
∆pt = ζ2∆wt + ϑ2gapt + θ2∆pbt,
3. The Incomplete Competition Model (ICM) –Layard et al. (1991), Carlin and
Soskice (1990), Kolsrud and Nymoen (1998), Bårdsen et al. (1998)–is in its
modern form presented as an equilibrium correction model, see Sargan (1964):
∆wt = α3∆pt − β3 (ws− γ2u)t−1
∆pt = ζ3∆wt + θ3 (pb+ η2ws)t−1 + ϑ3gapt−1,
Of course, there exist a host of other, more elaborate, models–a notable omission
here being non-linear PCMs. However, the purpose here is to highlight that discrim-
ination between the models is possible through testable restrictions. The diﬀerence
between the two Phillips curve models is that the NPCM is a reduced form that has
explicit forward looking expectations and has real unit labour costs, rather than the
output gap of the PCM. The ICM diﬀers mainly from the NPCM in the treatment
of expectations and from the PCM in the latter’s exclusion of equilibrium correction
mechanisms that are derived from conflict models of inflation, see e.g. Rowthorn
(1977), Sargan (1980), Kolsrud and Nymoen (1998). That said, also the PCM can be
reformulated as an EqCM. To see this, note first that the PCM assumes a stationary
rate of unemployment. Thus, internal consistency requires that the bivariate system
describing the PCM is augmented with an equation that links ut to e.g., the wage
share wst−1 Insertion of the equation for ut in the wage Phillips curve, turns the
latter into an explicit EqCM for wages. Thus, the essential diﬀerence between the
PCM and the ICM is found in the nature of the causal relationships that underlie
cointegration, rather than with cointegration as such.
We conclude that the models listed in 1.-3. are identified, in principle, but it
is an open question whether data and methodology are able to discriminate between
them on a given data set. Also, a highly likely outcome is that the inflationary
process contains elements from more than one model, for example by including
both cointegration and forward-looking expectations. We therefore test the various
identifying restrictions.
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When it comes to forecasting, the clearest logical distinction is between the
NPCM and the other two models. The PCM and ICM can be formulated as linear
diﬀerence equations with stable backward solutions. With stochastic disturbances
added, they belong to the class of causal or future-independent processes, see Brock-
well and Davies (1991, Chapter 3). For both models, the best (in terms of mean
square error) forecast corresponds to the conditional mean based on known initial
conditions. However, since the conditional means are model dependent, the rela-
tive forecast performance of the PCM and ICM merits investigation, see section 4
and 5. In contrast, the NPCM with rational expectations represents non-causal or
future-dependent processes. The solution for the rate of inflation in period T is thus
a function of the forcing variables in future periods T + h, h ≥ 0, and requires the
application of simulation methods.3 Thus, there is a premium on prior-to-forecasting
econometric testing of the NPCM model, as demonstrated in sections 3.3 and 3.4.
3 Empirical inflation models
In this section we develop empirical models of inflation. The wage variable wt used in
the following is average hourly wages in themainland economy, excluding the North-
Sea oil producing sector and international shipping. The productivity variable prt
is defined accordingly. The price index pt is measured by the oﬃcial consumer price
index. Import prices pbt are measured by the oﬃcial index. The unemployment
variable ut is defined as a “total” unemployment rate, including labour market
programmes. The tax-rates τ1t and τ3t are rates of payroll-tax and indirect-tax ,
respectively.4
The output gap variable gapt is measured as deviations from the trend obtained
by the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The other non-modelled variables comprise the length
of the working day ∆ht, which captures wage compensation for reductions in the
length of the working day–see Nymoen (1989). In addition, incomes policies and
direct price controls have been in operation on several occasions in the sample period,
see e.g., Bowitz and Cappelen (2001). The intervention variablesWdum and Pdum,
and one impulse dummy i80q2, are used to capture the impact of these policies.5
Finally, i70q1 is a VAT dummy. This system, where all main variables enter with
three lags, is estimated over 1966(4)—1994(4).
3With perfect foresight, and |δ1| > 1, there exist a unique backward solution, see e.g., Gourier-
oux and Monfort (1997, Chapter 12.4).
4Ideally, an income tax rate should appear as well. It is omitted from the empirical model, since
it is insignificant. This is in accordance with previous studies of aggregate wage formation, see e.g.
Calmfors and Nymoen (1990) and Rødseth and Nymoen (1999), where no convincing evidence of
important eﬀects from the average income tax rate on wage growth could be found.
5Wdum and Pdum are defined in the appendix.
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3.1 An incomplete competition model
Building on earlier research–Bårdsen et al. (1998)–we estimate the steady-state
to be represented by the two cointegrating relationships
w = p+ pr − 0.1u+ constant, (1)
pt = 0.6(w − pr) + 0.4pb+ τ3 + constant. (2)
This is practically the same result as reported by Bårdsen et al. (1998) on a sample
that ends in 1993(2).
When estimating a dynamic wage-price system we impose the estimated steady
state on a subsystem for {∆wt, ∆pt} conditional on {∆prt,∆ut−1, ∆τ1t, ∆τ3t}
with all variables entering with two additional lags. In addition to gapt−1, we also
augment the system with {∆ht, i80q2, i70q1,Wdum, Pdum} to capture short-run
eﬀects, as described above. The resulting model is given as
d∆wt = ∆pt − 0.4× 0.36∆pbt −∆τ1t−2 − 0.36
(0.08)
∆τ3t−2 − 0.3
(0.11)
∆ht
−0.08
(0.01)
[wt−2 − pt−2 − prt−1 + 0.1ut−2]
σˆ∆w = 1.02%
+ dummies
d∆pt = 0.12
(0.05)
(∆wt +∆τ1t−2) + 0.05
(0.02)
gapt−1 + 0.4× 0.07∆pbt − 0.07
(0.03)
∆τ3t−2 (3)
−0.08
(0.01)
[pt−3 − 0.6(wt−1 − prt−1 + τ1t−1)− 0.4pbt−1 + τ3t−3]
σˆ∆p = 0.41%
+ dummies
The coeﬃcient estimate of ∆pbt is restricted to be 40 per cent of the coeﬃcient
estimate of ∆τ3t−2 in both equations and this is denoted by e.g., 0.4× 0.36 in the
wage growth equation. These restrictions follow from the underlying theory model,
see Bårdsen et al. (1999) for details. The first equation in (3) shows that a one
percentage point increase in the rate of inflation raises wage growth by one percent,
suggesting an element of real wage rigidity. However, note that this result is condi-
tioned by the inclusion of an indirect tax-rate (∆τ3t), import price growth (∆pbt)
and the mentioned income policy variables (Wdum, and Pdum, not shown). Thus,
it is only in periods with no surprises in the exchange rate or in world prices, and
when discretionary policies are not in force, that nominal wages adjust quickly to
the “normal” or expected consumer price increases as captured by the unit coeﬃ-
cient of ∆pt in the first equation. By the same token, since import price growth
(∆pbt) is likely to be the most important “unexpected” part of price inflation, it is
not surprising that ∆pbt is attributed a negative estimated coeﬃcient in the first
equation of (3).6 Finally, the equilibrium-correction term is highly significant in the
equation for ∆wt, as expected from theory.
Turning to the second equation in (3), price inflation is significantly influenced
by wage growth and the output gap, together with eﬀects from import prices and
6The coeﬃcients of ∆pt, ∆pbt and ∆τ1t−2 in the wage equation are all examples of the overi-
dentifying restrictions whose joint significance is reported in Table 1.
5
indirect taxes–as predicted by the theoretical model. Deviations from the cointe-
grating price equation are significant, as is the eﬀect of direct price controls (not
shown).
Table 1: Diagnostics for the ICM model (3) and the PCM model (4).
Diagnostic tests for the model in (3)
The sample is 1966(4) to 1994(4), 113 observations.
σˆ∆w = 1.01%
σˆ∆p = 0.41%
Correlation of residuals = −0.4
Overidentification χ2(9) = 9.23[0.42]
AR 1− 5 F (20, 176) = 1.02[0.31]
Normality χ2(4) = 6.23[0.18]
Heteroscedasticity F (102, 186) = 0.88[0.76]
Diagnostic tests for the model in (4)
The sample is 1967(1) to 1994(4), 112 observations.
σˆ∆w = 1.07%
σˆ∆p = 0.47%
Correlation of residuals = −0.6
Overidentification χ2(16) = 25.13[0.07]
AR 1− 5 F (20, 176) = 1.02[0.44]
Normality χ2(4) = 6.23[0.18]
Heteroscedasticity F (102, 257) = 0.81[0.84]
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Figure 1: Recursive stability tests for the ICM model. The two upper panels show
one-step residuals from the wage and the price equations in (3). The lower right panel
is recursive N-up Chow-tests for parameter stability (see Chow (1960)), whereas
the lower left panel shows recursive tests of the overidentifying restrictions on the
estimated model in (3), see Hendry (1971) and Sargan (1988).
The upper part of Table 1 contains diagnostics for the model (3). Note that the
insignificance of Overidentification χ2(9) shows that the model in (3) encompasses
the unrestricted reduced form, thus encompassing the VAR, see Hendry and Mizon
(1993). The reported tests of residual misspecification are all insignificant. Parame-
ter constancy is demonstrated graphically in Figure 1. The two 1-step residuals with
their ± 2 estimated residual standard errors, ±2σ in the graphs are shown in the
upper panels, while the lower right panel shows the sequence of recursive forecast
Chow-tests together with their one-oﬀ 5 per cent critical level. Finally, the lower
left panel of Figure 1 shows that the model encompasses of the unrestricted reduced
form at every sample size (i.e., the end of the graph corresponds toOveridentification
χ2(9) in the table).
3.2 A Standard Phillips curve model
When estimating a Standard Phillips curve model, we start out from the same
information set as for the ICM, but with more lags in the dynamics, to make sure
we end up with a data-congruent specification. The preferred model is reported
in (4). Dynamic price homogeneity cannot be rejected in the wage equation, and
is therefore imposed. Otherwise it the models shares several of the properties of
7
(3), despite omitting the equilibrium correction terms. As reported in the lower
part of Table 1, the model encompasses its reduced form and shows no sign of
misspecification. The estimated equation standard errors, however, are higher than
the corresponding ones for it’s rival.
d∆wt = 1.11
(0.04)
∆pt − 0.11∆pbt − 0.65
(0.22)
∆τ1t − 0.41
(0.21)
∆τ1t−2 − 0.01
(0.005)
∆ut−3 − 0.006
(0.001)
ut−1
−0.16
(0.09)
∆τ3t−1 − 0.34
(0.09)
∆τ3t−2 − 0.30
(0.11)
∆ht + dummies
σˆ∆w = 1.07%d∆pt = 0.14
(0.03)
∆wt + 0.07
(0.02)
∆wt−3 + 0.17
(0.05)
∆pt−1 + 0.27
(0.05)
∆pt−2 + 0.05
(0.02)
∆pbt (4)
−0.03∆prt−1
(0.006)
+ 0.05
(0.01)
gapt−1 + dummies
σˆ∆p = 0.47%
Parameter constancy of the Phillips curve model is demonstrated graphically
in Figure 2. The two 1-step residuals with their ± 2 estimated residual standard
errors (±2σ in the graphs) are in the uppermost panels, while the lower right panel
shows the a sequence of recursive forecast Chow-tests together with their one-oﬀ 5
per cent critical level. The lower left panel shows that the model encompasses of
the unrestricted reduced form as the sample size increases (i.e., the end of the graph
corresponds to Overidentification χ2(16) in the table).
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Figure 2: Recursive stability tests for the PCM model. The two upper panels
show one-step residuals from the wage and the price equations in (4). The lower
right panel is recursive N-up Chow-tests for parameter stability (see Chow (1960)),
whereas the lower left panel shows recursive tests of the overidentifying restrictions
on the estimated model in (4), see Hendry (1971) and Sargan (1988).
3.3 A New Keynesian Phillips curve model
When estimating a New Keynesian Phillips curve model, we follow the approach of
Gali and Gertler (1999), but augment the specification with import price growth and
dummies for seasonal eﬀects as well as the special events identified in the previous
section. Estimation with GMM produced results very similar to Gali and Gertler
(1999):
d∆pt = 1.05
(0.108)
∆pt+1 + 0.04
(0.025)
wst − 0.03
(0.028)
∆pbt + dummies
Overidχ2 (10) = 10.91 [0.36] ,
where ws is the wage share and Overidχ2 is the test of the validity of the overiden-
tifying instruments. The instruments used are ∆wt−1, ∆wt−2, ∆pt−1, ∆pt−2, ∆t1t,
∆t1t−2, ∆ut−1, ∆ut−2, ut−1, ∆t3t, ∆t3t−1, ∆t3t−2, ∆ht.
To evaluate the model, we want to investigate the stability of the key para-
meters of the model as well as investigate the validity of the specification. Since
GMM can suﬀer from small sample problems, we estimate the parameters with
rolling regressions, using a fixed window of 85 observations. As Figure 3 shows,
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both the coeﬃcients of the wage share and the expected inflation rate exhibit not
only instability, but also a trending behaviour over the sample.
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Figure 3: Rolling regression coeﬃcients +/- 2 standard errors of the New Keynesian
Phillips curve.
As regards the validity of the specification, the following procedure might be
used for testing
∆pt = δ1∆pet+1 + ... (5)
as the maintained model of the rate of inflation:7
1. Assume that there exists a valid instrument set z =
£
z1 z2
¤
, where the sub-
set z1 is suﬃcient for overidentification of the maintained model.
2. Using z1 as instruments, estimate the augmented model ∆pt = δ1∆pet+1+ ...+
z2γ, under the assumption of rational expectations about ∆pet+1.
3. Under the maintained hypothesis, γ = 0 in the augmented model. Thus, non-
rejection of the null hypothesis of γ = 0, corroborates the feed-forward Phillips
curve. Otherwise, i.e. non-rejection of δ1 = 0 while γ = 0 is rejected statisti-
cally, the evidence is against the joint maintained hypothesis of (5) and rational
expectation about ∆pet+1.
To apply this test procedure to our data we only need one additional instrument,
namely the equilibrium correction term in the inflation equation of the ICM in (3)
above
z2 = ecmp (t) = pt−3 − 0.6(wt−1 − prt−1 + τ1t−1)− 0.4pbt−1 + τ3t−3.
7We thank David F. Hendry for suggesting this test to us.
10
Table 2: FIML estimated coeﬃcients of 1 and 2 periods leads when introduced in
the wage and price equations in ICM (3) and PCM (4). Estimated standard errors
in parenthesis .
ICM PCM
∆wt-equation ∆pt-equation ∆wt-equation ∆pt-equation
∆pt+1 0.24
(0.52)
0.65
(0.37)
∆pt+2 0.21
(0.58)
0.24
(0.37)
∆wt+1 −0.19
(0.13)
0.09
(0.06)
∆wt+2 −0.31
(0.21)
0.08
(0.05)
The results, using GMM, are
d∆pt = 0.06
(0.225)
∆pt+1 − 0.10
(0.029)
wst + 0.04
(0.022)
∆pbt − 0.12
(0.030)
ecmp (t) + dummies
Overidχ2 (10) = 8.19 [0.61] ,
establishing that the NPCM is not a valid representation of the inflationary process
in Norway.
3.4 Elements of NPCM: Testing for forward-looking expectations
Summing up so far, the NPCM appears to be too stylized and specific to act as a
good model of the inflationary process in Norway. The PCM and the ICM are better
candidates. However, alternative expectations hypotheses of explicit forward looking
terms in the two latter specifications merit further investigation by themselves, see
Moghadam and Wren-Lewis (1994).
Both the ICM and PCM are simultaneous equations models in ∆wt and ∆pt
and thus estimation by FIML implies that the models already have a (rational)
expectations interpretation in terms of the current dated wage and price growth.
Care must be taken when period t + 1 and t + 2 expectation terms of the same
two variables are included in the models, since identification problems occur. In the
calculations underlying table 2 we have tackled this problem by using a restricted
reduced form to predict e.g., ∆wt+1rather than the unrestricted reduced form, see
Blake (1991). In choosing the restrictions we have kept an eye on the estimated
residual standard errors of the aﬀected structural equations–they typically become
markedly larger than in (3) and (4) if the expectations formation is not suﬃciently
restricted. However, we avoided that the Overidentification Chi-square test became
significant, since that would entail a too restrictive expectations formation. Table
2 shows that in a majority of cases the forward terms are statistically insignificant.
The most significant term is ∆pt+1 in the PCM wage growth equation, however this
is also where the identification problems are most pronounced.
Part of the explanation for these results may be that there is a second expec-
tations interpretation of the current dated variables, namely that e.g., ∆wt in the
consumer price equation is by itself a predictor of ∆wt+1. The implied forecasting
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mechanism is quite simple, i.e. ∆∆wet+1 = 0, which is consistent with what students
of decision making tell us: that agents often resort to rules of thumb or “routines”
when faced by complex uncertainty, see Simon (1965), Nelson and Winter (1982)
and Shleifer (2000). Fundamental uncertainty is indeed a valid characteristic of
economic time series as they are influenced by unit-root and deterministic shifts.
Comparison of forecasting rules confirm that ∆∆wt+1 = 0 is a robust forecasting
tool in that the eﬀects of deterministic shifts are corrected, see Clements and Hendry
(1999), Eitrheim et al. (1999).
4 Forecast errors of stylized inflation models
On the basis of above evidence, there is no need to shoulder the impracticalities
of forecasting inflation with the rational expectations NPCM. Thus, the remaining
sections are devoted to the forecast properties of the two backward looking models.
For that purpose, we formulate a simple DGP to investigate the theoretical fore-
casting capabilities of the ICM and the PCM estimated in the previous section, thus
providing a background for the interpretation of the actual forecast errors in section
5.
In order to obtain an analytically tractable distillation of the gist of the empir-
ical models, we introduce several simplifying assumptions. For example, we retain
only one cointegrating relationship, the “wage-curve”, and we also abstract from
productivity. Thus (6) is a simplified version of the equation in the first line of (3):
∆(w − p)t = κ− πw[(w − p)t−1+ λut−1 − µ] + ²w,t, πw > 0,λ > 0. (6)
The wage-curve is the term in square brackets. The parameter µ denotes the mean
of the long run relationship for real wages, i.e. E[(w−p)t−1−λut−1−µ] = 0. Since we
abstract from the cointegration relationship for consumer prices, the simultaneous
equation representation of the inflation equation is simply that ∆pt is a linear
function of ∆pbt and ∆wt, and the reduced form equation for ∆pt is
∆pt = φp + ϕpb∆pbt − πp[(w − p)t−1+ λut−1 − µ] + ²p,t, ϕpb ≥ 0, πp ≥ 0. (7)
Multi-step (dynamic) forecasts of the rate of inflation entails forecasts of import price
growth and the rate of unemployment. In order to simplify as much as possible, we
let ∆pbt and ut follow exogenous stationary processes:
∆pbt = φb + ²pb,t (8)
∆ut = φu − πuut−1 + ²u,t, πu > 0. (9)
IT denotes the information set available in period T . The four disturbances (²w,t, ²p,t,
²pb,t, ²u,t) are innovations relative to IT , with contemporaneous covariance matrix
Ω. Thus, the system (6)-(9) represents a simple data generation process (DGP) for
inflation, the real wage, import price growth and the rate of unemployment. The
forecasting rule
c∆pT+h = E[∆pT+h | IT ] = a0+ a1δpb+ a2E[(w− p)T+h−1 | IT ] + a3E[uT+h−1 | IT ],
h = 1, 2, ....H. (10)
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with coeﬃcients
a0 = φp + πpµ,
a1 = ϕpb,
a2 = −πp
a3 = −πpλ
is the minimum mean squared forecast error (MSFE) predictor of ∆pT+h, by virtue
of being the condition expectation.
In order to abstract from estimation uncertainty, we identify the parameters
of the ICM with the probability limits of the corresponding estimated coeﬃcients.
The dynamic ICM forecasts errors have the following means and variances:
E[∆pT+h − c∆pT+h, ICM | IT ] = 0, (11)
Var[∆pT+h − c∆pT+h, ICM | IT ] = σ2p + σ2pb (12)
+a22
h−1X
i=1
(1− πw)2(h−1−i)σ2w
+a22(πwλ)
2
h−1X
i=1
(1− πw)2(h−1−i)
iX
j=1
(1− πu)2(i−j)σ2u
+a23
h−1X
i=1
(1− πu)2(h−1−i)σ2u
The first two terms on the right hand side of (12) are due to ²p,T+h and ²pb,T+h. The
other terms on the right hand side of (12) are only relevant for h = 2, 3, 4...H. The
third and fourth terms stem from (w − p)T+h−1 – it is a composite of both wage
and unemployment innovation variances. The last line contains the direct eﬀect of
Var[uT+h−1] on the variance of the inflation forecast. In addition, oﬀ-diagonal terms
in Ω might enter.
We next the consider the case where a forecaster imposes the PCM restriction
πw = 0 (implying πp = 0 as well). The “Phillips-curve” inflation equation is then
given by
∆pt = a˜0 + a˜1∆pbt + a˜3ut−1 + ²˜p,t,with (13)
a˜0 = a0 + a2λE[ut−1] + a2µ, and
²˜p,t = ²p,t + a2[(w − p)t−1− λut−1 − µ].
This definition ensures a zero-mean disturbance E[˜²p,t | IT ] = 0. Note also that
Var[˜²p,t | It−1] = σ2p, i.e., the same innovation variance as in the ICM-case. The
PCM forecast rule becomesc∆pT+h,PCM = E[∆pT+h,PCM | IT ] = a˜0 + a˜1δpb + a˜4uˆT+h−1.
The mean and variance of the 1-step forecast-error are
E[∆pT+1 − c∆pT+1,PCM | IT ] = (a1 − a˜1)δpb + uT (a3 − a˜3)uT + a2{(w − p)T − λE[ut]− µ},
Var[∆pT+1 − c∆pT+1,PCM | IT ] = σ2p + σ2pb.
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The 1-step ahead prediction error variance conditional on IT is identical to the ICM-
case. However, there is a bias in the 1-step PCM forecast arising from two sources:
First omitted variables bias imply that a1 6= a˜1 and/or a3 6= a˜3, in general. Second,
(w − p)T − λE[ut]− µ 6= 0
unless (w−p)T = E[(w−p)t], i.e., the initial real wage is equal to the long-run mean
of the real-wage process.
For dynamic h period ahead forecasts, the PCM prediction error becomes
∆pT+h − c∆pT+h,PCM = (a1 − a˜1)δpb + (a3 − a˜3)uˆT+h−1 + a3 h−1X
i=1
(1− πu)h−1−i²u,T+i
+²pb,T+h + ²p,T+h
+a2(w − p)T+h−1 − a2(λE[ut]− µ)
Taking expectation and variance of this expression gives
E[∆pT+h − c∆pT+h,PCM | IT ] = (a1 − a˜1)δpb + (a4 − a˜4)uˆT+h−1 (14)
+a2{E[(w − p)T+h−1 | IT ]− λE[ut]− µ},
Var[∆pT+h − c∆pT+h,PCM | IT ] = Var[∆pT+h − c∆pT+h,ECM | IT ]. (15)
for h = 2, 3, ...H.
Hence systematic forecast error is again due to omitted variables bias and the fact
that the conditional mean of real wages h− 1 periods ahead, departs from its (un-
conditional) long-run mean. However, for long forecast horizons, large H, the bias
expression can be simplified to become
E[∆pT+H − c∆pT+H,PCM | IT ] ≈ (a1 − a˜1)δpb + (a4 − a˜4)ϕuπu (16)
since the conditional forecast of the real wage and of the of the rate of unemployment
approach their respective long run means.
Thus far we have considered a constant parameter framework: The parameters
of the model in equations (6)-(9) remain constant not only in the sample period
(t = 1, ..., T ) but also in the forecast period (t = T + 1, .....T + h). However, a
primary source of forecast failure is structural breaks, especially shifts in the long-
run means of cointegrating relationships and in parameters of steady-state trend
growth, see e.g. Doornik and Hendry (1997) and Clements and Hendry (1999,
Chapter 3). Moreover, given the occurrence of deterministic shifts, it is no longer
true that the “best” econometric model over the sample period also gives rise to the
minimumMSFE. Instead, the model forecasts can be beaten in a forecast contest by
non-causal forecasting rules based on diﬀerencing, i.e. dVARs, because such rules
are robust to regime shifts that have occurred prior to the forecast period, see e.g.,
Clements and Hendry (1999, Chapter 5), Eitrheim et al. (1999) and Eitrheim et al.
(2002).
This trade-oﬀ between modelling of structure versus robustness in forecasting
is illustrated by the following example: Assume that the long-run mean µ of the
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wage-equation changes from its initial level to a new level, i.e. µ→ µ∗, before the
forecast is made in period T , but that the change is undetected by the forecaster.
There is now a bias in the (1-step) ICM real-wage forecast:
E[(w − p)T+1 − d(w − p)T+1,ICM | IT ] = −πw[µ− µ∗], (17)
which in turn produces a non-zero mean in the period 2 inflation forecast error:
E[∆pT+2 − c∆pT+2,ICM | IT ] = −a2πw[µ− µ∗]. (18)
The PCM-forecast on the other hand, is insulated from the parameter change in
wage formation, since d(w − p)T+h−1does not enter the predictor–the forecast error is
unchanged from the constant parameter case. Consequently, both set of forecasts for
∆pcT+2+h are biased in the situation with a shift in µ, and there is no logical reason
why the PCM forecast could not outperform the ICM forecast on a comparison of
biases. In terms of forecast properties, the PCM, despite the inclusion of the rate
of unemployment, behaves as if it was a dVAR, since there is no feed-back from
wages and inflation to the rate of unemployment in the example DGP.
Finally, consider the consequences of using estimated parameters in the two
forecast rules. This does not change the results about the forecast biases. However,
the conclusion about the equality of forecast error variances of the ICM and PCM
is changed. Specifically, with estimated parameters, the two models do not share
the same underlying innovation errors. In order to see this, consider again the case
where the ICM corresponds to the DGP. Then a user of a PCM does not know the
true composition of the disturbance ²˜p,t in (13), and the estimated PCM will have
an estimated residual variance that is larger than its ICM counterpart, since it is
influenced by the omitted wage-curve term. In turn, the PCM prediction errors
will overstate the degree of uncertainty in inflation forecasting. We may write this
as
Var[˜²p,t | IT , PCM ] > Var[²p,t | IT , ICM ]
to make explicit that the conditioning is with respect to the two models (the DGP
being unknown). From equation (13) it is seen that the size of the diﬀerence between
the two models’ residual variances depend on i) the strength of equilibrium correction
(a2) and ii) the variance of the long-run wage curve.
The main results of this section can be summarized in three points
1. With constant parameters in the DGP, PCM will bias the forecasts and over-
state the degree of uncertainty, if it involves invalid restrictions.
2. PCM forecasts are however robust to changes in means of (omitted) long-run
relationships.
3. Thus PCM share some of the robustness of dVARs, but also some of its draw-
backs (excess inflation uncertainty).
In sum, the outcome of a forecast comparison is not a given thing, since in
practice we must allow for the possibility that both forecasting models are misspeci-
fied relative to the generating mechanism that prevails in the period we are trying to
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forecast. A priori we cannot tell which of the two models will forecast best. Hence,
there is a case for comparing the two models’ forecasts directly, even though the
econometric evidence of section 3 favoured the ICM as the better model over the
sample period.
5 Forecasting inflation
Both models condition upon the rate of unemployment ut, average labour productiv-
ity prt, import prices pbt, and GDP mainland output yt. In order to investigate the
dynamic forecasting properties we enlarge both models with the same relationships
for these four variables. All of these variables are potentially aﬀected by interest
rates and are therefore potential channels for monetary instruments to influence
inflation. Also, none of these variables are likely to be strongly exogenous. For
example, import prices depend by definition on the nominal exchange rate. Below
we report a model that links the exchange rate to the lagged real exchange rate,
which in turn depend on the domestic price level. The details of the additional
relationships are given in Bårdsen et al. (1999), but the qualitative properties can
summarized as
∆vt = f
µ
rext−1
−
, oilpricet
−
,∆RSt
−
,
¶
∆yt = f
µ
EqCMyt−1
−
,∆yt−i
−
,∆crt−1
+
¶
∆ut = f
Ã
∆yt
−
,∆ut−1
+
, ut−1
−
, stut−1
+
,∆ (w − p)t−i
−
, lmpt
−
!
∆prt = f
µ
∆3prt−1
−
,∆ut−1
−
¶
where rext is the log of the real exchange rate, RSt is the money market interest rate,
EqCMyt is an equilibrium correction term for an aggregate demand relationship,
and crt is a function of credit demand–see Bårdsen and Klovland (2000). Fur-
thermore, stut denotes non-linear eﬀects in unemployment adjustment, while lmpt
measures the eﬀect of labour market programmes.
Figure 4 illustrates how the ICM-based model forecast some important vari-
ables over the period from 1995(1) to 1996(4). The model parameters are estimated
on a sample that ends in 1994(4). These dynamic forecast are conditional on the
actual values of the non-modelled variables (ex post forecasts). The quarterly in-
flation rate ∆pt only has one significant bias, in 1996(1). In that quarter there was
a reduction in the excises on cars that explains around 40 per cent of this particu-
lar overprediction. In the graphs of the annual rate of inflation ∆4pt this eﬀect is
naturally somewhat mitigated. The quarterly change in the wage rate ∆wt is very
accurately forecasted, so the only forecast error of any importance for the change in
real wages ∆ (w − p)t also occurs in 1996(1). The forecasts for the rate of unemploy-
ment are very accurate for the first 5 quarters, but the reduction in unemployment
in the last 3 quarters does not appear to be predictable with the aid of this model.
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Figure 4: Dynamic forecasts of the ICM model for the period 1995(1)—1996(4), with
95% prediction bands.
Figure 4 also contains the 95% prediction intervals in the form of ±2 standard
errors, as a direct measure of the uncertainty of the forecasts. The prediction inter-
vals for the annual rate of inflation are far from negligible and are growing with the
length of the forecast horizon.
Next, Figure 5 illustrates how the model based on the Phillips curve forecast
the same variables over the same period from 1995(1) to 1996(4). For most variables
the diﬀerences are negligible. For the quarterly inflation rate ∆pt in particular, the
Phillips curve specification seems to be no worse than the ICM as regards the point
forecasts, although the prediction intervals are somewhat wider, due to the larger
residual variances in wage and price setting.
However, in the graphs of the annual rate of inflation∆4pt the result is after all
a diﬀerence between the predictions on this one-oﬀ comparison. Since ∆4pˆT+h,mod is
a 4 quarter moving average of the quarterly rates, the same is true for the prediction
errors, thus
∆4pT+h −∆4pˆT+h,mod =
3X
i=0
(∆pT+h−i −∆pˆT+h−i,mod), mod = ICM , PCM. (19)
Until 1995(4) there is zero bias in ∆4pˆT+h,PCM because all the preceding quarterly
forecasts are so accurate. However, ∆4pˆT+h,PCM becomes biased from 1996(1) and
onwards because, after the overprediction of the quarterly rate in 1996(1), there is no
compensating underprediction later in 1996. The ICM forecasts on the other hand
achieve exactly that correction, and do not systematically overpredict inflation.
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Figure 5: Dynamic forecasts of the Phillips curve model for the period 1995(1)—
1996(4), with 95% prediction bands.
For the annualized inflation rate the uncertainty increases quite rapidly for
both models, but markedly more so for the Phillips curve forecast. Indeed, by
the end of the two year period, the forecast uncertainty of the Phillips curve is
about twice as big as the dynamic ICM model. This eﬀect is clearly seen when
the annual inflation forecasts from the two models are put together in the same
graph. The dotted lines denote the point forecasts and the 95% prediction bands
of the dynamic ICM, while the solid lines depict the corresponding results from
the forecasts of the Phillips curve specification. At each point of the forecast the
uncertainty of the Phillips curve is bigger than for the ICM. Indeed, while the ICM
has a standard error of 0.9 percentage points 4-periods ahead, and 1.2 percentage
points 8-periods ahead, the Phillips curve standard errors are 1.6 and 2 percentage
points, respectively. Considering equation (19) it transpires that the explanation is
not only that each Var[∆pT+h −∆pˆT+h,PCM ] > Var[∆pT+h −∆pˆT+h,ICM ], but also
that the PCM quarterly prediction errors are more strongly positively autocorrelated
than the ICM counterparts.
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Figure 6: Comparing the annual inflation forecasts of the two models. The thin line
is actual annual inflation in Norway. The dotted lines denote the point forecasts
and the 95% prediction error bands of the ICM model in (3), while the solid lines
depict the corresponding results from the forecasts of the standard Phillips curve
specification (PCM in (4)).
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6 Conclusions
The strong linkage between forecasting and policy analysis makes the role of econo-
metric models more important than ever. Policy makers face a menu of diﬀerent
models and an explicit inflation target implies that the central bank’s conditional
forecast 1-2 years ahead becomes the operational target of monetary policy. The
presence of non-stationary data and frequent structural breaks makes inevitable a
trade-oﬀ between the gain and importance of correct structural modelling and their
cost in terms of forecasting robustness. We have explored the importance of this
trade-oﬀ for inflation forecasting.
Specifically, we have considered the two most popular inflation models, namely
Phillips curves and wage curve specifications. We establish that Phillips-curve fore-
casts are robust to types of structural breaks that harm the wage-curve forecasts,
but exaggerate forecast uncertainty in periods with no breaks. Moreover, omitted
relevant equilibrium correction terms induces omitted variables bias in the usual way.
Conversely, for the wage curve model, the potential biases in after-break forecast er-
rors can be remedied by intercept corrections. As a conclusion using a well-specified
model of wage-price dynamics oﬀers the best prospect of successful inflation fore-
casting.
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A Data definitions
A.1 Notes
1. Unless another source is given, all data are taken from RIMINI, the quarterly
macroeconometric model used in Norges Bank (The Central Bank of Norway).
2. For each RIMINI-variable, the corresponding name in the RIMINI-database
is given by an entry [RIMINI: variable name] at the end of the description.
(The RIMINI identifier is from Rikmodnotat 140, Norges Bank, Research de-
partment, 19th April 1999)
3. Several of the variables refer to the mainland economy, defined as total econ-
omy minus oil and gass production and international shipping.
4. In the main text, impulse dummies are denoted iyyqx, where yy gives the
year with two digits and x contains the quarter (1,2,3). Hence i80q2 is 1 in
the second quarter of 1980, and is 0 in all other quarters.
A.2 Definitions
gap Output gap defined as log mainland GDP(log of the variable Y as defined
below) deviations from trend, where the trend is estimated by the HP-filter
using λ = 1600. Fixed baseyear (1991) prices. Mill. NOK.
H Normal working hours per week. [RIMINI: NH]
P Consumer price index. 1991=1. [RIMINI: CPI].
PI Deflator of total imports. 1991=1. [RIMINI: PB].
Y Total value added at market prices in the mainland economy. Fixed baseyear
(1991) prices. Mill. NOK. [RIMINI: YF].
PR Mainland economy value added per man hour at factor costs, fixed baseyear
(1991) prices. Mill. NOK. [RIMINI: ZYF].
RS 3 month Euro-krone interest rate. [RIMINI: RS].
τ1 Employers tax rate. τ1 =WCF/WF − 1.
τ3 Indirect tax rate. [RIMINI: T3].
U Rate of unemployment. Registered unemployed plus persons on active labour
market programmes as a percentage of the labour force, calculated as employed
wage earners plus unemployment. [RIMINI: UTOT].
W Nominal mainland hourly wages. Constructed from Rimini-database series as:
W =WIBA ∗ TWIBA+WOTV J ∗ (TWTV + TWO + TWJ))/TWF
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Wdum Composite dummy for wage freeze: 1 in 1979.1, 1979.2,1988.2 and 1988.3.
Pdum Composite dummy for introduction and lift of direct price regulations. 1 in
1971.1, 1971.2,1976.4,1979.1. -1 in 1975.1,1980.1,1981.1,1982.1. Zero other-
wise.
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